Extended Exposure:Advising Veterans of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Over In-Service Conduct by Wandler, Hillary A.
The Alexander Blewett III School of Law
The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings Faculty Publications
2014
Extended Exposure:Advising Veterans of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction Over In-Service Conduct
Hillary A. Wandler
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, hillary.wandler@umontana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Hillary A. Wandler, Extended Exposure:Advising Veterans of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Over In-Service Conduct , 61 Fed. Law. 14
(2014),
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/110
14 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER • OctOber/NOvember 2014
On June 4, 2014, former U.S. Marine Corporal 
Wilfredo Santiago was convicted of making false statements to 
investigators about his involvement in an accidental, non-fatal 
shooting of Navy Hospital Corpsman Michael John Carpeso in Iraq.1 
The shooting occurred more than six years before Santiago was 
convicted and almost five years before he was indicted. 
Santiago was still in the Marine Corps then, finishing his third 
tour of duty in Iraq. After first denying involvement in the shooting, 
he eventually admitted his M9 pistol fired while he was clearing it, 
sending a bullet into the Navy corpsman’s temple.2 Santiago was 
not court martialed after his admission, even though Naval Criminal 
Investigative Services (NCIS) fully investigated the incident while 
he was still in active service. 
When Santiago’s active service was terminated, he remained a 
reservist until 2011, when he was honorably discharged from the 
Marine Corps.3 This cut off the military’s jurisdiction to prosecute 
him for the shooting under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.4 
Because the shooting happened while Santiago was on foreign soil, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) also lacked jurisdiction to charge 
him. That left only one option: a statute allowing prosecution of 
a former member of the armed forces for an offense committed 
outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction—the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA). Asserting jurisdiction under 
MEJA, the U.S. Attorney’s Office indicted Santiago in the Southern 
District of New York in January 2013.5
Prosecutions under MEJA were not new. Between 2005 and 
2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) had referred 100 cases to 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for prosecution under MEJA,6 including 
some of the most noteworthy indictments and convictions under 
the act. These included the indictments against civilian security 
guards working for the Department of State contractor Blackwater 
Worldwide for the shooting in Baghdad’s Nisur Square and the 
conviction of former Army Private Steven Green for the noncombat 
rape and murder of Iraqi civilians.7
But the nature of Santiago’s prosecution, which involved an 
honorably discharged service member whose conduct was known 
and fully investigated while he could be court martialed, has caused 
some to seriously question MEJA’s continued use against former 
service members. Southern District of New York Judge Colleen 
McMahon said that civilian jurisdiction over former service mem-
bers outside the reach of court martial “came as a great surprise” to 
her. “[T]his law was not passed to cover the Wilfredo Santiagos of 
this world,” Judge McMahon stated, “and its use in this context is 
fraught with the possibility for mischief.”8 For veterans’ advocates 
focused primarily on disability compensation, a client's extended 
exposure to criminal prosecution under MEJA could be equally as 
unexpected.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 was primar-
ily crafted to establish federal criminal jurisdiction over civilians 
employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside of the 
United States.9 This includes (1) civilian employees, (2) contrac-
tors and subcontractors, and (3) employees of contractors and 
subcontractors.10 Dependents of members of the armed forces and 
those “employed by the Armed Forces” also fall under the act’s 
jurisdiction.11
The act amended Title 18 of the U.S. Code, not by adding new 
sections to the crimes covered there, but by establishing jurisdiction 
over offenses committed outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction. It tar-
geted conduct that would have been punishable under the Title 18 
Crimes section by imprisonment for more than one year had it been 
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committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.”12
The act also extended federal criminal jurisdiction to former 
service members. First, a member of the armed forces may be 
prosecuted under the act if that person is no longer subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Second, a member of the 
armed forces who is still subject to the UCMJ may be prosecuted 
under the act if at least one co-defendant is not subject to the UCMJ. 
In either case, the act does not disturb a military tribunal’s concur-
rent jurisdiction.13
Although foreign governments rarely prosecute U.S. citizens for 
crimes committed on their soil, if a foreign government chose to 
exercise jurisdiction, the act may preclude prosecution for the same 
conduct in U.S. courts. In that circumstance, if the United States 
recognizes the foreign government’s jurisdiction, prosecution in 
U.S. courts may proceed only if the attorney general approves the 
prosecution.14
The act authorizes DOD law enforcement officers to arrest a 
suspect based on probable cause. Once arrested, the accused must 
be handed over to U.S. civilian law enforcement “as soon as prac-
ticable.”15 Finally, even when civilian law enforcement authorities 
take custody of the accused, they cannot immediately remove the 
accused to the United States or any other foreign country without 
action by a federal magistrate, the Secretary of Defense, or the 
accused.16
A federal magistrate may appoint “qualified military counsel.”17 
All initial proceedings, including arrest, detention, delivery, and 
removal, are governed by DOD regulations.18
The act encourages notice to foreign nationals who may be 
subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction due to their work with the U.S. 
armed forces.19 However, it does not require or encourage notice to 
members of the armed forces about the potential for post-discharge 
criminal prosecution in civilian courts.
Legislative Intent
As Judge McMahon noted, “This law was not passed to cover the 
Wilfredo Santiagos of this world.”20 Proponents of the act focused 
almost exclusively on American civilians. In the House report 
accompanying H.R. 3380, the Committee on the Judiciary described 
a “jurisdictional gap” that allowed crimes committed by American 
civilians—examples included sexual assault, arson, robbery, larceny, 
embezzlement, and fraud—to “go unpunished” when committed 
overseas. According to the committee, the gap was created because 
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes and the 
foreign country in which the crimes were committed declined to 
exercise its jurisdiction “when an American [was] the victim or when 
the crime involv[ed] only property owned by Americans.”21
The report discussed how civilians employed by or accompany-
ing the armed forces overseas were originally subject to prosecution 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.22 However, after a series 
of U.S. Supreme Court cases limited the code’s reach over civilians 
to times of congressionally declared war, the only remaining author-
ity with jurisdiction over civilian crimes committed overseas was the 
foreign government of the country in which the crime was commit-
ted. Because foreign governments often waived their jurisdiction 
and chose to not prosecute American civilians, particularly when 
no person or property from the foreign country suffered damage in 
the crime, many crimes committed by civilians went unpunished.23 
Although the United States could bar the civilian perpetrator from 
its overseas military installations or terminate any contract it had 
with the individual, it had no ability to prosecute the individual 
using existing U.S. criminal statutes, which applied only to crimes 
committed within U.S. borders.24
The committee asserted the U.S. government had two moral jus-
tifications for punishing crimes committed by civilians employed by 
and accompanying the military overseas. First, but for the military’s 
presence in the foreign country, the civilian employees and depen-
dents would not be there. Because the military’s presence in the 
foreign country was a factor that made these crimes possible, the 
committee asserted the government had a clear interest in punish-
ing the civilians who committed the crimes. Second, the committee 
found the government was morally justified in using U.S. law to pun-
ish anyone who harmed an American victim or property.25
In addition to these moral justifications for the act, the com-
mittee noted the practical consequences of allowing civilian crimes 
committed overseas to go unpunished. Robert E. Reed, DOD asso-
ciate deputy general counsel, noted negative consequences the 
military had already experienced and anticipated could still develop 
from allowing civilian crime to go unpunished. These included 
decreased deterrence, morale, and discipline in the overseas 
military community; “the strong potential for embarrassment in the 
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international community”; expected increase in hostility in local 
communities where the military was stationed; and the potential for 
damaged relationships between the United States and its allies.26 In 
the same hearing, Roger Pauley of the Department of Justice noted 
that in some recent peacekeeping missions, foreign host nations had 
been reluctant to enter into agreements that would cede jurisdic-
tion over U.S. civilians in the country with the military “because of 
awareness that the United States lack[ed] statutory mechanisms to 
exercise such jurisdiction.”27
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) spoke in support of H.R. 3380, 
asserting: “This bill fills the jurisdiction gap in the law that has 
allowed rapists, child molesters, and a variety of other criminals 
to escape punishment for their crimes.”28 Sen. Saxby Chambliss 
(R-Ga.) also spoke in support of the bill, providing several examples 
of crimes that had gone unpunished because of the jurisdictional 
gap, all of which were committed by civilians:
Let me give you just a couple of examples of the problem 
our military faces. In one instance, a Department of Defense 
teacher raped a minor and videotaped the event. The host 
country chose not to prosecute, and our government did not 
have jurisdiction to prosecute the teacher. 
In another case, the son of a contract employee in Italy com-
mitted various crimes, including rape, arson, assault, and 
drug trafficking. Again, because of a lack of jurisdiction to 
prosecute, as a punishment for these criminal acts the son 
could only be barred from the base.
Finally, an Air Force employee molested 24 children ages 9 to 
14. However, because the host country refused to prosecute, 
the only recourse was again to bar this individual from the 
base. Certainly these flimsy punishments do not match the 
seriousness of the crimes these individuals committed.29
No proponent of the act offered examples of unpun-
ished crimes committed by former members of the armed 
forces.30
 
Continuing Focus on Civilian Employees and Dependents
Proponents of this extended jurisdiction have focused and 
continue to focus on civilians employed by and accompanying the 
armed forces, which is understandable given their longtime routine 
presence in military missions. In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reported that, of locations where civilians connected 
to the Department of Defense were stationed abroad, several had 
“more dependents … stationed there than service members.”31 The 
GAO’s report, recommending MEJA-like legislation two decades 
before the act came to fruition, opened by stating, “There is virtually 
no U.S. civilian or military criminal jurisdiction over the 343,000 U.S. 
citizen civilian employees and dependents accompanying the U.S. 
military forces overseas.”32 Testifying in support of the act in 2000, 
Assistant Judge Advocate General for the Army Joseph R. Barnes 
confirmed nearly the same point about more modern contingency 
operations: “It is not unusual … for the number of civilians accom-
panying U.S. forces to actually outnumber the number of military 
personnel engaged in that operation.”33
After 2000, the civilian presence with deployed armed forces 
once again became significant. Although the number of civilian con-
tractors in Iraq was not always clear in Operation Iraqi Freedom,34 
the U.S. Central Command was reporting more than 160,000 civil-
ian contractors by August of 2008.35 Between 2007 and 2008, U.S. 
force levels in Afghanistan drastically increased in response to a 
strengthening Taliban, by 82 percent from June 2007 to June 2008.36 
As noted in the Defense Program Support Reports on contractor 
support for DOD operations, the number of contractors working in 
Afghanistan significantly increased along with the U.S. force lev-
els.37 In November, 2008, when Department of Defense operations 
were ongoing in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan were rapidly 
increasing, the civilian contractor workforce was at 266,678.38 The 
Department of Defense had been “criticized for its contracting prac-
tices in Iraq, and the accounting of contractor personnel in particu-
lar.”39 The U.S. Central Command reported efforts to improve over-
sight and accountability for civilian contractors, including a memo-
randum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding first 
responses to allegations that contractors had committed or were the 
victims of crimes.40 In a 2009 article written after his deployment 
to Iraq, Lt. Col. Charles T. Kirchmaier noted, “The sheer number 
of contractors living and working on the battlefield alongside our 
nation’s armed forces suggests that civilian misconduct incidents 
will likely occur during the course of a unit’s deployment.”41
While the number of DOD civilian contractors overseas has 
been steadily declining since 2008, the percentage of civilians in 
the United States’ deployed force remains significant—enough of a 
presence to justify vigorous enforcement of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction over civilians. In 2011, 52 percent of the Department 
of Defense workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan was made up of 
civilian contractors.42 In January 2014, the Department of Defense 
reported a total of 99,057 contractors overseas.43 Most of the con-
tractors were in Afghanistan, and the total number of contractors 
had dropped 27 percent from January 2013, and 35 percent from 
January 2012.44 The ratio of contractors to military in Afghanistan 
had increased to 1.46-to-1 by January 2014. 
Between 2005 and 2009, the Department of Defense had 
referred 100 cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be prosecuted 
under MEJA.45 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the pre- and post-
enactment focus on civilian misconduct, DOD statistics in late 2009 
showed only 7 of those 100 cases involved former members of the 
armed forces; the U.S. Attorney’s Office had declined to charge 
or prosecute four of those seven referrals, only one referral was 
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reported to have resulted in charges or prosecution, and the other 
referrals were still pending.46 The DOJ reported eight total convic-
tions under MEJA since its enactment, including one of a former 
Army private indicted after discharge.47
Noteworthy Prosecutions of Former Armed Forces
In fact, in 2008 and 2009, the DOJ tried two former service 
members. One trial ended in acquittal and caused many to publically 
question MEJA’s reach over former members of the armed forces.48 
The other ended in one of the eight MEJA convictions and was 
lauded as justifying the act’s reach. 
In November 2006, former Army Private Steven Dale Green was 
indicted in the Western District of Kentucky on 17 counts, including 
conspiracy, first-degree murder, felony murder, aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child, and firearms offenses.49 Green had enlisted at the 
age of 19 and deployed to Iraq in September 2005, stationed near 
Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad.50 By December, Green had report-
ed to a combat stress team that he “wanted to kill all Iraqis,” and 
he had been prescribed antipsychotic medication.51 In March 2006, 
Green and three other soldiers stationed at the same traffic check 
point walked to a nearby house intending to rape a 14-year-old Iraqi 
girl they had seen living there. They killed the girl’s family and raped 
and killed her, burning her body and the home after the crime. 
Green confessed to his involvement in the crimes shortly after the 
bodies were discovered, but evidence showed the noncommissioned 
officer who heard his confession did not report it to the company 
commander.52 While the initial investigative team blamed the killings 
on Iraqi counterinsurgents, the soldiers’ involvement was uncovered 
on June 20 during a combat stress counseling session with another 
soldier. FBI agents arrested Green on June 30, 2006.53 Green had 
been discharged 45 days earlier, cutting off the military’s jurisdic-
tion to prosecute him under the UCMJ.54 The U.S. Attorney’s Office 
asserted that MEJA “was specifically enacted to prevent the absur-
dity of allowing people like [Green] to escape any prosecution solely 
because they happened to have been discharged from the service 
before their criminal conduct was uncovered.”55
Before Green’s case went to trial, the DOJ indicted and tried 
another former member of the armed forces, Marine Sergeant 
Jose Nazario. In June 2007, Nazario was charged under MEJA with 
involuntary manslaughter, assault with a dangerous weapon, and 
firearms charges, all related to conduct committed in a 2004 military 
operation in Fallujah, Iraq.56 The indictment alleged that Nazario 
and other Marines shot and killed four Iraqis they had detained 
during a firefight in the second battle of Fallujah on Nov. 9, 2004.57 
Nazario was discharged from the Marines in October 2005 and 
decorated for valor in connection with his actions during Fallujah 
battles.58 Defense counsel argued that the court should dismiss 
the indictment in part because Nazario’s alleged conduct occurred 
during combat, something a lay jury would have a difficult time 
evaluating.59 The defense team moved for judgment of acquittal, 
arguing that the absence of physical evidence was “striking.” “Most 
notably, the government has not produced any corpses, photos of 
the deceased, or autopsy reports,” the defense argued.60 On Aug. 28, 
2008, the civilian jury found Nazario not guilty on all counts.61 Jurors 
reportedly struggled with the complexity of military operations and 
the task of judging combat actions, calling its role in the case unfair 
and “a nightmare.”62
Eight months later, a civilian jury found former Army Private 
Green guilty on all counts.63 
Encouraged by the conviction of former Private Green and 
unfazed by the acquittal of Nazario, Assistant Attorney General Lanny 
Breuer testified in 2011 before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that his office—the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special 
Prosecutions Section—had been “aggressively” enforcing MEJA. 
“We have had great success in bringing cases under MEJA, and are 
committed to continuing to enforce MEJA vigorously,” Breuer told 
the committee.64 Former Corporal Santiago was indicted in January 
2013. 
Anomaly or Trend?
Both factually and mathematically, Santiago’s conviction could 
be seen as exceptional, an anomaly. He is one of only three former 
service members charged and fully prosecuted under MEJA, and 
he was the only one of those three whose conduct was actually 
discovered by a commander and fully investigated while he was still 
a member of the armed forces. After Judge McMahon’s scathing 
criticism of the use of MEJA against a former service member whose 
criminal conduct was fully known before he was discharged, the cur-
rent version of the act may not be long for this world. 
Section 3261(d) could be modified to prohibit use of the act 
against a former member of the armed forces unless the service 
member ceases to be subject to the UCMJ and the service member’s 
conduct that would constitute an offense was not actually discov-
ered by a commander while he or she was still subject to the UCMJ. 
The frustration Judge McMahon expressed with the bureaucratic 
inner workings of the Marine Corps legal community suggests an 
amendment could go even further, beyond conduct “not actually 
discovered” to include conduct that “should not have been actually 
discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.” 
Either modification could result in complicated inquiries focus-
ing on conversations, reports, and evidence available only on foreign 
soil, often in a theater of war. As Breuer testified, even the current 
requirement that a non-DOD employee’s work relate to “support-
ing the mission of the Department of Defense overseas” results in 
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complex investigations that can become “extremely challenging and 
resource-intensive.”65 Yet, either modification would better ensure 
the act is used only when conduct truly does not surface until after 
discharge from the military.
The irregularity of Santiago’s prosecution is also what makes it 
significant—the attention Judge McMahon has drawn to the use 
of MEJA against former members of the armed forces should be 
important not only to the military legal community and federal 
prosecutors, but also to the growing force of advocates representing 
recently returned veterans.
A veteran’s advocate typically focuses on a veteran’s character 
of discharge for how it impacts his or her access to health care and 
eligibility for benefits. An honorably discharged veteran has a wealth 
of options available, in contrast to a veteran with “bad papers,” who 
has a more difficult road to obtaining treatment and compensation 
for injuries or diseases incurred in service. To the extent a veteran’s 
advocate explores an honorably discharged veteran’s conduct 
committed overseas, it is usually to understand how the veteran’s 
experiences in combat connect to current physical and mental dis-
abilities. But the prosecution of former Corporal Santiago, as well as 
other former members of the armed forces, stands as a warning to 
broaden our awareness beyond substantiating eligibility for benefits 
and services. Until the act is modified, advocates must be aware 
that recently returned veterans—even those receiving honorable 
discharges—may be prosecuted in civilian courts for in-service con-
duct committed while in uniform overseas.66 
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